Religion put to the service of nationalism
Originating in societies to the north of the Mediterranean, two movements had run through the nineteenth century, one of a social nature, one of a nationalist nature. The second one, in many cases, was strengthened by reference to religion as, in the heart of the continental empires with religious pluralism (the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire), this helped to mobilise the population against the central authority. During the same period, the maritime powers (Great Britain, France) were rearming to compete with the new nation states of Germany and Italy. In 1911, the struggle between France and Germany over Morocco turned in France's favour with the Treaty of Fez (March 1912). In this context, and in spite of the Ottoman Empire's proposals for negotiation, Italy conquered the provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan (September 1911-October 1912). Recognising the weak state of the Ottoman army and fearing to find themselves in the hands of European powers with little concern for the fate of the Eastern Christians, the Balkan League (Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Bulgaria) at the same time declared war on the Ottoman Empire (October 1912).
Russia at that time presented herself as faithful to her mission to protect her “little brother Serbia” in particular and Orthodox Christians in general. But they were divided, in spite of the League's victories against the Porte of Istanbul. The differences between the Serbs and the Bulgars erupted over the partition of Macedonia. A second Balkan war broke out (June-July 1913), during which Bulgaria took on her erstwhile allies, joined by Romania. The Ottoman Empire seized this chance to retake the territories lost a few months earlier. In both cases the conflicts were very fierce and led to the displacement of populations according to religion, many Muslims taking the road east to place themselves once again under the authority of the Ottomans.
This aspect was not absent from the dispute between the Serbians and the Austrians between the end of June 1914 and the end of July, nor from the competing justifications which their allies then put forward. At the moment of declaring war at the beginning of August 1914, Germany, until then anglophile, described Great Britain as “perfidious” for invoking the Entente with Russia and France. Adolf von Harnack[1] , director of the Royal Library of Berlin, drafted Wilhelm II[2]'s proclamation to 'the German people' on 6 August: “The enemy is assaulting us in times of peace. So stand up! To arms!” A few weeks later, with 93 'representatives of German science and art', he signed an appeal to 'the civilised world' which positioned Germany as in the defensive, justifying the violation of Belgian neutrality. As for the Austro-Hungarian episcopate, it was united behind the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl[3] , who declared in October 1914: “We fight for the truth and the right, we fight for God and our holy faith, we fight for our emperor and our fatherland. In this fight for all that is most sacred to us, God is with us!” On the opposing side, the violation of Belgian neutrality was described as a 'barbarous act' against the heart of the Triple Entente. In the absence of the King, the Government and Parliament, Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines, put himself at the head of the struggle in the name of the Catholic faith. In the pastoral letter entitled Patriotism and Endurance, he sought to describe the struggle in terms of the theological concept of the 'just war' which begins with a promise of redemption .
The Catholic and Protestant authorities tried in vain to quench the fire. The sympathies of the Roman church were at first with the Austrian cause, but the words of comfort sent to Vienna after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand[4] did not endorse war against Serbia, which had just signed a Concordat (24 June 1914). Elected Pope on 3 September 1914, Benedict XV[5] condemned all crimes and their protagonists (Ad Beatissimi, 1 November 1914). Catholics were invited to pray for peace, but each episcopate interpreted the Pope's words in the sense of 'peace for the just' in order to accord with the patriotism of the faithful. The dominant impression remains that the Pope was under pressure from the enemy from all sides. At the same time, Monseigneur Nathan Söderblom, Lutheran Archbishop of Uppsala in neutral Sweden, launched an 'Appeal for peace and the Christian communion' which fell on deaf ears . Both public appeals and diplomatic efforts by these Christian authorities were fruitless at a time when each belligerent believed they could rapidly win the day.
In attacking the Russian Black Sea ports, the Ottoman Empire provoked the Entente powers to declare war in November 1914. Supported by the ulema, the Sheikh – al- Islam[6] promulgated a fatwa[7] in which he exhorted all Muslims, Ottoman or otherwise, to “the sacred religious duty to participate in jihad with body and wealth”. Propaganda in favour of the Sultan was spread through preachers and students to encourage uprisings in enemy empires. Vienna had ambitions to take the place of France as the protector of Eastern Catholics. But the Austro-Hungarian authorities, more hesitant in their dealings with the Ottomans than the Germans were, did not have a clear plan for how to do so. The influence of the fatwa was weak outside the Sublime Porte. Of those of note, only the Algerian-Tunisian Salah al-Sharif[8] backed it with the brochure The Truth about Holy War (1916), in which he said that defensive jihad was “an individual, obligatory duty against the aggressor, France, England and Russia”. The work, translated from the Arabic, was published in Berlin.
On the announcement of the declaration of war, while declaring its loyalty to the Ottoman government, the Dachnak[9] raised a militia of tens of thousands of volunteers in the Transcaucasus capable of supplementing the forces of the Russian army. Aware of the risks in the light of the collapse of the Ottoman Third Army, Enver Pasha[10] ordered the transfer of Armenian soldiers to 'work battalions', where they were massacred. It was the beginning of a genocide. The bombardment of the Armenian quarter of the town of Van, ordered by Djevdet Pacha[11] in early spring 1915 because the Dachnak had refused to raise volunteers, was followed by an insurrection which resulted, on the one side, in wholesale deportations, and on the other, by the entry of Russian troops into the town. The Istanbulite elite of the Armenian millet[12] was decapitated by the arrest of several hundred leaders. The massacres were extended to other Armenian populated areas during the summer of 1915, then the deportations affected the Armenians of Cilicia, sent to the town of Deir ez-Zor on the Euphrates. The Entente powers denounced these “mass murders”, while German diplomats feared being accused of interference in favour of a minority if they raised objections. A press campaign initiated by the president of the German oriental Mission which got the backing of clerical circles and around fifty of those close to the Chancellor had no effect. All that was authorised was, thanks to the American ambassador, humanitarian aid from Armenian and Syrian Relief (later Near East Relief) for the Armenians and other hungry and oppressed communities such as the Syrians.
The Great Memorandum, presented by the Russian Prime Minister to British and French diplomats on 7 March 1915, clearly set out his aims: aside from control of the straits of Marmara, it was to seize Istanbul-Constantinople. The United Kingdom accepted a first set of agreements, but made it plain that it wanted to take a hand in the region. The Viceroy of India, opposed to counter appeal to jihad which risked putting the Muslims outside his authority, landed Anglo-Indian troops in Basra (November 1914). They established good relations with the Sheikh of Kuwait and Ibn Saud[13], head of the Najd tribe, but they were defeated by the Ottomans in April 1916. The next move of the British in Cairo was to take advantage of the Arab uprising, with the involvement of T E Lawrence[14] , working with Faisal[15] , one of the sons of the Sharif of the 'Holy Places' of Islam, Hussein ibn Ali[16] . London, which had just imposed a protectorate on Egypt, urged the latter to take part: “If the Arab nation assists the English in this war, England guarantees no interference in Arabia and will give to the Arabs every assistance against external aggression........Perhaps an Arab of pure race may assume the Caliphate of Mecca and Medina” (31 October 1914). Hussein had demonstrated his opposition to the Young Turks[17] and their project for legal modernisation. He contented himself with sending the standard of the Prophet of Islam to Damascus to accompany the army in its expedition against Suez, which failed, while ignoring two other demands: relaying the call to jihad and raising a tribal army in Hejaz. He declared a revolt in June 1916 and proclaimed himself 'King of the Arabs'. But the British recognised him only as 'King of Hejaz', after having secretly negotiated a partition of the region with the French (Sykes-Picot agreement, May 1916), backed by the Russians and Italians.
Italy entered the war, promised a share of the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, on condition that the Holy See would be excluded from peace negotiations (May 1915). Romania and Bulgaria, Orthodox with Catholic and Muslim minorities, fought, one on the side of the Entente powers and the other for the Central powers. Portugal's choice was determined by the announcement of German ambitions towards Angola and Mozambique. However, a Republican party had pacifist leanings and these converged with those of the Catholic Monarchist opposition which was hostile to 'atheist France' and 'Schismatic England' in a climate of 'apparitions of the Virgin of Fatima'. The germanophile party triumphed with the accession of the dictator Sidonio Pais[18] who abandoned the Portuguese expeditionary force to its fate. In spite of this, its casualties (10 000 on the battlefields of Europe and Africa) allowed her entry to the peace negotiations and the grant of modest reparations.