Introduction
The emergence of the Saadian movement at the beginning of the 16th century is a remarkable moment in time for historians in that they can hereafter base their research on more and more plentiful written sources recorded in Morocco but also in Portugal and Holland. This is not owed to chance but to the Saadian's deliberate choice to devise an ideological historiography and political foundation legitimizing a movement that its adversaries deemed disloyal to the makhzen[1] . In Moroccan tradition, the makhzen refers to the central power as it arose from the Almohads[2] breach of relations with the Abbasid caliphate and its subsequent tribal foundation. These sources have been thoroughly exploited at the beginning of the 20th century by Europeans then by the new generation of Moroccan historians. Both groups have reached converging conclusions: power as set up by the Saadians marks a turning point in Moroccan history. Their rise represents a breach with earlier dynastic models, be they Almoravid, Almohad or Marinid[3] . These dynasties based their legitimacy in « esprit de corps » or assabyya[4] as described by Ibn Khaldun[5] . Conversely the Saadians defined their legitimacy through the interweaving of political and religious thought. The marabouts gave it significant support in more ways than one, becoming the very soul of the movement and giving it political and social vigour.
On the strength of their study of the functions of the zawiya[6] as base institution, and noting its influence on political and social life, researchers cite the importance of the religious factor as a major driver of Morocco's historic evolution. A comparative approach will help reposition, in Laraoui's terms, “the maraboutic movement” in reference to “the Hilalian tribal model”. Hence the necessity to delve into the modalities of the Saadians' rise to power and to establish the extent to which maraboutism[7] surpassed the Khaldunian model and at which point it “succeeded in appropriating the second [tribal] model” (Abdallah Laroui). Or, in other words, can we describe the Saadian model as going beyond the heritage described and analysed by Ibn Khaldun? To begin answering this question, it behoves to take the full range of sources into consideration and to prioritise the study of micro-history.
Contemporary studies of the Saadians focus on the tierce that accounts for their breakthrough and their temporary success: maraboutism, sharifism[8] and jihad[9] . Relevant though they be, these criteria should not obscure others. We shall do well not to overlook the role of the Souss' tribal structures, the weight of the economic factor in internal balances of power, or the significance of Portuguese inroads and economic domination, in the emergence of the Jazouli[10] inspired marabouts. A range of historiographic questions remain unanswered: Is it true that the marabouts' role was to ease tribal tensions and to uphold social order thus ensuring a united front before the Portuguese conquest? Is it true that Souss populations had to unite under Saadian leadership to recover their lands from foreign invaders and free their economy from Portuguese monopoly and /or its Arab collaborators'? Where does the factor come in of the mythical Saadian Sharifs (or Shorfa) who posed as « mystically inspired Mahdis[11] and as imams[12] perpetuating the Jazoulite heritage »
(M. Kably).