The Saadian movement from traditional bay'ah of Islam to bay'ah of jihad
Saadian historiography has focussed on the conditions that gave rise to the Saadian movement; See for instance the chronicler Abd al Rahman al-Fasi in his work Zahrat ash-Shamarikh . At the turn of the 18th and 19th century, the historian Abu al-Qasim al-Zayyani indicated, in Al-Turjumana al-Kubra, that the Souss tribes decided to consult, then to back al-Qaim[1] on the strength of his wisdom, his piety and his devotion to jihad but also because he bore the title of sharif and belonged to a Jazouli confraternity. On the basis of the information collected, the reasons for the rise of the Saadian movement can be summarised as follows: the weakness of the Makhzen; strife between tribes; Portuguese outposts far south on the coast with loss of the monopoly on the Trans-Saharan trade; the vitality of Jazouli maraboutism at a time when tribal hierarchies were destabilised; a strongly felt expectance of the Mahdi in those parts of the Souss outside the Banu Wattas's control. It is in this broad context that the Zawiya of Aqqa's leader counselled the endorsement of Al-Qaim as jihad commander.
The self-promotion Al Qaim conducted before his appointment by the Zawiya of Aqqa's leader would be the platform for his eventual political campaign. He appointed his two sons to lead the military action against the Portuguese. He forced tribal leaders to put his son Ahmad al-Araj[2]in charge of the Jihad as emir[3] and commander of the military forces. With a view to give political legitimacy to his action and lasting momentum to his movement he put together a political programme stating that his aim was to unify the Souss tribes under the leadership of a clear-sighted leader who would defend their interests against the Portuguese and those Oulad Jarrar[4]tribes that collaborated with them. He went on to bemoan Muslim hardship explaining them as a direct consequence of the central power's weakness and its inability to lead a jihad against the « infidel »
. In other words, he was turning the temporary nature of his « jihad emirship »
into a lasting investiture, regardless of the fact that the Wattassids remained the legitimate monarchs according to the legal terms of the Bay'ah[5] as stated in his oath. This was the founding act of the Saadian movement.
What followed confirmed the nature of al-Qaim's political project, the aim of which was not confined to leading the jihad in the Souss region alone but to do battle in zones under Wattassid control and to fight the Wattassids themselves. Al-Qaim was circumventing the essentially provisional principle of the bay'ah, pushing his two sons to leave the Souss and settle in areas controlled by the Makhzen. In 1524 the Wattassids' second capital, Marrakesh became Saadian with the help of Abdallah Al-Gazwani[6]the leader of the Jazouli brotherhood who stopped propping the Wattassids to join the new jihad leaders. After 1525, the Saadian's movement emerged as an « Emirate of the Muslims »
. The move to take over Marrakesh confirmed the Saadians' intent to go well beyond their jihad leadership investiture and to be seen as the new contenders for political power. They were however faced with a Wattassid legitimacy long and unanimously accepted by the Ulama. Among court jurists, the debate raged as to whether it was possible to call on the moment's new, freshly declared « imam »
, strong man and his partisans. Traditionally the mubayi[7] must observe the clauses of the Muslim oath: to defend the Muslim faith and the « land of Islam »
, lead the fight against the « Infidel »
, bring about « divine justice »
. With a few exceptions, the Wattassid capital's Ulama refused accordingly to follow the Southern Moroccan tribes who had given their pledge to the Saadians. In their estimation, Muhammad al-Burtuqali, the Wattassid sultan remained legitimate as long as he kept up the jihad against the Portuguese and upheld the faith – especially since he had helped the Saadian princes in their early fights against the Portuguese. This debate must be set in a broader framework which takes into account the eminent position of Fes' ulama in Moroccan intellectual life. Because of the cultural and historic importance of the city, they were considered the supreme authority on religious life and the guardians of the Muslim faith. They would rue the day: between 1549 and 1554, Mohammed ash-Sheikh[8] had all Fes ulama who had refused to confirm the legitimacy of the Saadian power executed.
The better to understand the Saadians' success it is important to insist on the nature of the choice of al-Qaim as a jihad leader and of the political forces that were involved in his investiture. The marabouts ruled the roost, they lead units armed for jihad, they ran the propaganda that advanced political change. The Zawiyas on which they relied were not just places of worship but centres set up to form disciples able in a crisis to take political action. Though traditionally the bay'ah was essentially a legitimating process drawing its influence and its value from the representative institutions' unanimity, the Saadians' jihadist bay'ah owed its influence to the support granted by the marabouts who were thus able to introduce a new model of government based on religious principles. For many historians, the rise of the Saadians is nothing but the political consecration of the marabouts' programme, hence the ambiguous nature of their power.
