Politics Religion and State building (11th – 16th/19th centuries)

The Zawiya was a distinctive body resulting from a long drawn historical process. The premises of a Sufi movement were first mooted in the 11th century under the Almoravids. Its spiritual dimension originally took precedent but it did not stop the Sufis from being influent in all segments of society. The religious leaders became the adjudicators between enemy factions in cross-tribal conflicts. In as much as the tribes recognised it, the Zawiya acted as court of the tribal nations. As a more extended institution, it ended up embodying the foundation of political authority in a fragmented society. It played a key role in achieving a new balance. This interweaving of the religious, economic, social, educational and political strands in society was at the source of the tensions with reigning dynasties dismayed at the reduction in the scope of their authority. The Marinids sought to stem the tide but, faced with defeats, they watched it gain ground instead. The Sufis succeeded in creating autonomous elites who had true power. Zawyias became the main institution of Saadian power thus reaching a high point in their history.

The authority of the Souss Jazouli zawyia was critical. Two leading figures, Ibn al-Mubarak^[1], master of the Zawyia of Aqqa and Baraka Ben Ali^[2], master of the Zawyia of Tidssi played a key role in the Saadians' investiture. In order to bolster this choice, they joined forces broadcasting their approval throughout the Moroccan South and beyond through their disciples. The zawyia's role did not stop at the Saadian's political success for zawyias also acted in the related economic field. At times of famine and drought Jazouli disciples roamed the countryside to attend to the needs of the impoverished peasants. This bolstered the image of the Saadians in their fight against the Fes-based Makhzen. As from the Saadians' entrance in Marrakesh in 1524, Abdallah al-Ghazwani, great sheikh of the brotherhood, masterminded their legitimization, whether by leading military operations against the Wattassids or by dispatching his disciples on relief operations in the famished countryside. In return the Jazouli marabouts achieved a historical legitimacy much sought after ever since their founder Muhammad al-Jazouli had started his two decades long fight towards establishing a political model that would unite all Maghreb Muslims and fight the Christians come from the Iberian Peninsula on the basis of the taleem (teaching) andadhkar (invocations) inspired by his mystic doctrine. His principles were quintessential to the Saadian political project, hence the significance of religion in bringing this power about.

The –hitherto embryonic – makhzen took on a new dimension. Under Ahmad al-Mansur^[3],it embraced « court institutions and etiquette » (M.N. Mouline), the centralised organisation and administration of the state and also a governance model. The « Saadian Makhzen » was devised according to clear hierarchy wherein the sultan^[4] acted as a nucleus drawing to himself all the functions. The formal organisation of the makhzen was pyramidal from the vizir^[5] to the pachas^[6], the caids^[7]down to military administration. The bureaucracy was a dominant feature of the system but its key foundation remained the army with its diverse factions, its many support bases and its tribal reserves. From a symbolic point of view, the sultan was the supreme representative with all functions concentrated in his hands. He was responsible for the safe keeping of the common wealth, he had the monopoly over tax setting and was the commander of the armed forces to such an extent that the title of vizier had soon become honorific and fell to court grandees and the sultan's close associates, chosen among the most trusted. The Saadian makhzen that had adopted the previous dynasties' practices, drew its renewed powers from managing the institutions along Iberian and Ottoman models: the authority was centralised, the administration more effective. It relied mostly on the support of the tribes and foreign military units. Some speak of a « new Makhzen », of the renewal of the traditional functions, of « Saadian political school » playing on symbols and harbouring absolute, nay supernatural pretensions. Indeed it also enjoyed another and very effective tool : the title of « Sovereign Sharif » (M.N. Mouline).