An art of alliance politics
In the field of external relations, the Emir's action reflected his purposeful independence from the Porte. In concerted moves, Fakhr al-Din appointed envoys to represent him, sending a Sunni Muslim to the sublime Porte, a Shia to the Shah of Persia, and entrusting the care of European affairs to a Maronite prelate.
Diplomatic guarantees were brittle: in 1607, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany, Ferdinando I[1], concluded a military accord with the Pasha of Aleppo Ali Jambulad[2], who had stopped paying taxes to the Sultan and had seized Tripoli and Damas in 1606. However the Grand-Duke gave the Pasha no support when he was attacked by the Ottomans that same year. Fakhr al-Din's room for manoeuvre was narrow: allied to the Pasha, he had to persuade the Porte that the military back-up provided to Ali Jambulad to conquer Damas and Tripoli was not directed against the Ottoman power. To that end, he sent his son Ali bearing lavish gifts to Constantinople. At the same time, he was signing in Sidon an accord with Ferdinando I according to which he allowed Florence and some other European powers access to some harbours (Acre, Tyre, Beirut), thus breaching the Porte's command : for a whole century, only ships sailing under the French royal banner had enjoyed this privilege.
Ferdinando I's fleet enabled him to defend Tuscany's coastline and to protect his sea trade but in no way to weigh in in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire. It would appear that the economic and cultural dimensions of the relationship were what mattered to Fakhr al-Din. Indeed, he refused the advances from two European powers: France and Spain though the latter promised to fortify Tyre's harbour. Our two chroniclers concur in their assertion that these relations did not account for the confrontation between the Emir and the Sultan in the 1613 campaign. Ahmad al-Khalidi al-Safadi downgraded the event to an « aggression »
rather than a full-scale campaign, dispensing with any mention of a Druze revolt the Emir might have lead. His review of the events of 1633 does not allow for more enlightening observations. Sultan Murad IV[3] ordered the Pasha of Damas to march against the Emir. The latter was captured then executed in Constantinople on 13 April 1635 with his three sons.
Both biographers portray Fakhr al-Din as a hero; for different motives, they both downplay the confrontation that opposed the Emir to the Sultan. Ahmad al-Khalidi al-Safadi emphasised the Sunni practice, implying de facto respect for and loyalty to the Sultan who is also caliph. Estephan al-Douaihy insisted on the ruler's tolerance towards the Christians and the absence of any thought of emancipation from the Sultan, in order to preserve the Ma'an emirate, weakened as the 17th century came to a close. The political and religious motivations of each author are thus quite clear. Other readings would be developed at the time of the foundation of the State of Lebanon in September 1920 : for a majority of Christians at the time, Fakhr al-Din was a founding figure of modern Lebanon; for a majority of Muslims, he was an Arab hero who had fought Turkish tyranny. Specifically Druze sources still have much to reveal. The open study of these documents would allow for an appreciation of, say the role of taqiyya[4] in the exercise of power.
