Politics Religion and State building (11th – 16th/19th centuries)

Economical factors would play a major part in the struggle for power: with the sovereign confining his authority to Marrakesh and thereabouts, the power vacuum was keenly felt. The Zawiya of Dila which dominated all the Middle-Atlas and the city of Fez sought to make this region its Saharian base the income of which it could use in order to conquer the rest of Morocco and thus control the coast and make contact with the European powers. The Dilaites enjoyed some influence over the Berber tribes of the Eastern High Atlas. However they were not alone in their desire to monopolise the region's trade. The Zawiya of Illigh /Tazerwalt, based in the Sous and trading with (mostly English and Dutch) Europeans also had its sights on the axis connecting the prosperous Touat to the Tafilalt at a time when the Draa region was becoming peripheral. Local religious leaders had a positive influence on commercial activity and the revival of this axis seems to account for a relative dynamism on the southern face of the Atlas. Now such prosperity lead Abou Hassoun Semlali^[1], of the competing Tarzerwalt zawiya to look East and become involved in Tafilalt affairs where two groups were facing each other.

Zawiyas

Oued Ifli's Alaouite Shorfa were firmly established in the Tafilalt, they controlled the caravan trade on the Touat-Tafilalt axis but were not in a position to sustain direct relations with the Northern Atlas and the city of Fez controlled by the Zawiya of Dila and they were in competition with Ksar Tabouassant, once a major halt for Draa caravans headed for the Bilad es-Sudan. The proclamation of Mawlay Ali Cherif^[2] as emir set off wars between Tafilalt Ksours : Tabouassant turned to the Dilaites for help, to which the Shorfa responded by an alliance with Abou Hassoun Semlali. However, once arrived in the Talifalt to rescue his allies, Abou Hassoun settled down in the oasis and refused to leave. He had a representative fixed up in the place, who built a Kasbah^[3] to consolidate his hold on the region. Abou Hassoun decided to negotiate with Tabouassant, home to a strong trading Jewish community – which was also to the advantage of his ally Mawlay Cherif. Upon seeing their interests in the region under threat the Dilaites returned to the offensive. In 1634 (H. 1044), taking advantage of Abou Hassoun's absence, Mohammed al-Hajj al-Dila'i gained military control of Ksar as-Souk. He forced a pact on Mawlay Ali Cherif whereby the control of this route to the Atlas would be ceded to him as would the settlements of Tabouassant and Goulmina against the withdrawal of his armed forces towards the Middle Atlas. According to Larbi Mezzine's research, Mohammed al-Hajj was driven by nothing but the firm intention to get his cut out of a thriving trade, which had nothing in common with the Semlalites' ambition of military domination.

Abou Hassoun meanwhile was not to be disposed of so lightly. Leaving the Sous with his troops again, he defeated Mawlay Ali Cherif in 1638, imprisoned him and allowed the people of Tabouassant to move back to their ksar whence they had been displaced by Sidi Muhammad ibn Sharif, another Alaouite Sharif. Having taken refuge in the Sahara, the latter would be back two years later, supported by nomadic Arab tribes, to confront Abou Hassoun. Muhammad ibn Sharif also reinforced his power in the Touat where his kaids^[4] collected taxes and he challenged Mohammed al-Hajj al-Dila'i . His master plan was to control all the trade traffic and to that end he had to gain the upper hand not only in the Tafilalt but also in a Northern Morocco controlled by the Dilaites – whose ambitions were exactly the same. The major show down took place at the battle of Lgara in 1646 (H. 1056). Victory went to the Dilaites; they contracted a new pact with the Shorfa, wherein their respective zones of influence were outlined. The Jbel Ayachi would now be the demarcation line between them although Mohammed al-Hajj claimed the right to control five strongholds along with the sheikhs who held them : As-Souk, Aït Athmane, Goulmina, Asrir and Oulad Aissa. No sooner had the Dilaites forces left the region than the pact was broken by the Alaouites : Oulad Aissa was attacked and other terms were violated by Mawlay Muhammad.

Mausoleum of Mawlay Ali Cherif

Of Sharifian descent, the Alaouites enjoyed a religious prestige quite equal to their Saadian cousins' barakah^[5] and with it a sound chance to gain the upper hand. But they acted as warlords rather than as marabouts. Their first forays were modest : before the Dila troops, they failed at tactical and military level. In the mid 1660s, Mawlay Rachid^[6], Mawlay Muhammad's brother put paid to the latter's rule and became the true founder of the Alaouite dynasty when he managed to cross the Atlas and seized Fes then Northern Morocco in 1666. The Zawiya of Dila fell to his attacks at the end of the 17th century, followed by the Zawiya of Tazerwalt. According to Laroui these successes owed much to his opponents' internal collapse. The Alaouites' power-building bears out Southern hegemonic drives leading Morocco's outer populations to conquer and structure it. Then could Sharifism – not to be confused with zawiya mysticism – be deployed. Henceforward, Sharifism and the will for independence would be closely bound together in the Moroccan mind. And, with the Ottoman Empire no longer in a position to pursue conquest in the region, the foreign powers the country would face would be essentially Christian.