Competing faith communities and economic difficulties
Among Middle-Eastern populations, the Christian communities connected to Rome and to France, had enjoyed preferential contacts with Europe. Since the 16th century and the treaty known as the « Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire »
signed in 1528 between Francis Ist[1] and Suleiman the Magnificent[2], the French monarchy has enjoyed a status of protector of minorities within the Ottoman Empire. Progressively, the training of part of the Maronite and Melkite clergies in Italy, the creation of schools on the European model, the involvement of Catholic religious congregations, Italian at first then French, in competition with Anglo-Saxon Protestant missions, the foundation of Masonic lodges[3], the reverberations of half a century of European revolutions and the ideas that motivated them were to accelerate a rift between the communities. Two phenomena compounded each other : one directly linked to faith groups' internal activity, the other to political and economical transformations within the Ottoman Empire.
The sparring between Muhammad Ali[4] and the Ottoman Sultan combined with the personal leadership of Emir Bashir II[5], keen to outweigh the power of Acre's pashas, Jezzar Pasha[6] 's in particular, lead to a period of emigration that would reach its peak in the second half of the century during the mutasarrifiyya[7] years (1861-1915). The Egyptians called the migrants “the Syrians” : Shawam[8]. They were, for the most part, Christians hailing from Mount Lebanon ; the faith dimension, though decisive, does not appear to have been an exclusive factor. The dissemination of European medical techniques and improvement in hygiene levels had levered a section of the population into a demographic transitional phase evidenced at first by a noticeable growth as the drop in death rate took hold much more quickly than the drop in birth rate. In mountainous regions this increased the pressure on land ownership for newly formed families : inheritance-driven land splits just cannot go on for ever. The government brought in measures aimed at modernising farming but its endeavours failed. Meanwhile, the taxes fixed by the pashas[9], the emirs[10] and the sheikhs[11] were augmented by the corvée and other duties exacted by feudal lords. Peasant indebtedness, deepened by high interest rates, was compounded by the low cost set on crops. It was next to impossible to buy seeds, animals, agricultural tools. Toiling a relatively low-grade soil, the poorest, whose situation was not far short of destitution chose to leave the land.
From a faith point of view, we have minorities who had over the centuries found refuge in those naturally defended regions – sometimes fighting each other in the process : the Druze[12] settled in the Chouf, Gharb, Matn and Wadi-al-Taym. The Shia[13] , in the Jabal Amel, north of the Bekaa valley and in a few Kesrouan villages. The Orthodox[14] and Melkite[15], a majority presence in the Koura made up with the Sunni[16] the bourgeoisie of cities such as Beirut and Tripoli in particular. The Maronite[17], first concentrated in the northern part of Mount Lebanon moved down towards the Byblos region and the Kesrouan, before settling in most regions of present-day Lebanon forming an archipelago of isolated communities, and thus fragile at times of crisis. Such sporadic tensions did come about as a result of the fight for influence engaged by the European powers – France and Great Britain foremost among them but also Austria – all relying on patronage networks to back up their position in strategic catchment areas. Two faith groups readily played on their rivalry : the Druze, backed by London and the Maronites close to Paris.
The 1840 massacres occurred a few months after reforms were launched throughout the Ottoman Empire aimed, under European pressure, at setting up a juridico-political system fairer to all millets[18]. They would leave in all memories a lasting resentment stoked by the sense of group-belonging that grew ever keener over the twenty or so years of anarchy associated to the Kaimakamate[19]. The 1860 wave of massacres, which reached Damascus and invited in a French military presence in August signified an even more violent outbreak : it made more than 22,000 victims saw 320 villages destroyed along with hundreds of places of worship. The Maronites came out the most affected community, especially after the second onslaught. For this reason, for a few years, some French diplomats contemplated the settlement of Maronites in Algeria where French colonisation had started, echoed in this by some Maronite clergy. Those projects were not realised as the French government proved more anxious to keep its allies in the region than to provoke a mass exodus.
Date | Estimation | Date | Estimation |
|---|---|---|---|
1867 | 380,000 | 1900 | 400,000 |
1887 | 395,000 | 1905 | 382,000 |
1897 | 399,530 | 1913 | 468,714 |
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The advent of the Mutasarrifiyya regime brought about a period of politico-religious peace : however, at the economic level, things got tougher. The protocol of 5 June 1861 deprived the region of the following cazas (districts) : Beirut, Tripoli, Aklar, Sidon and the Beqaa minus Zahle. It further forbade developing the ports of Jounieh and Byblos (Jbeil) even as the region slid into an ever greater dependence on Mediterranean trade. In half a century the production of food crops had dropped considerably compared to that of silk in yarn or cocoons : in 1913, 40% of Mount Lebanon's arable land was dedicated to mulberry bushes. Spinning was the most important activity for the Lebanese industry but the establishments were run by Europeans, essentially French, or local middlemen in cahoots with Lyons or Marseilles businessmen. Two factors would by and by restrict the markets for local production : first technical progress in Europe which led Italian and Swiss manufacturers to come and sell their products in the region ; next the opening of the Suez Canal which eased the promotion of Japanese and Chinese silk on European markets. Whether in period of growth or slump, the silk industry's benefits to the local populations had not been great. Thus, and for that reason too, emigration represented a lifeline, in that those who had left the country helped their kin survive. The sums sent by the migrants represented 40% of cash income at the turn of the century.
Income from cocoon production | 60,000,000 |
|---|---|
Income from silk spinning and by-products | 20,000,000 |
Other farming income | 20,000,000 |
Other trade, manufacturing and industrial income | 10,000,000 |
Tourism and hospitality | 20,000,000 |
Migrants' net remittance | 90,000,000 |
Total | 220,000,000 |
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